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MENTAL ILLNESS ON APPEAL AND THE RIGHT
TO ASSIST COUNSEL
Joe Hennell*

In the United States, the criminal appeals process is the last chance for
prisoners to contest a conviction, and in some cases, to prevent execution.
However, prisoners struggling with mental illness have no right to
participate in the process.
The case of Ron Lafferty highlights this problem. In 1984, Lafferty was
sentenced to death for the murder of his sister-in-law and her young
daughter.' According to Lafferty, God commanded him to do it.2 He chose
execution by firing squad.
In 1991, Lafferty's conviction was overturned because the trial court used
the wrong standard to find him mentally competent to stand trial.4 In 1994,
he underwent another competency evaluation. He was then granted a new
trial in 1996 and again was found guilty and sentenced to death.' In 2007,
the Utah Supreme Court denied Lafferty's request for a new trial.6 He filed
a writ of habeas corpus in federal court in an effort to stop his execution.
In December of 2010, Lafferty's attorneys argued for a stay of the
proceedings, claiming he could provide insight and information pertinent to

*The author wishes to thank his family for their support, Associate Professor Cara Drinan
for providing him with expert advice on the topic, and The Journal of Contemporary
Health Law and Policy for guiding him through the writing process.
1.
Emiley Morgan, Ron Lafferty Case Will Proceed While the Man's Competency
is Evaluated, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
705365658/Ron-Lafferty-case-will-proceed-while-the-mans-competency-isevaluated.html?pg-2.
2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.
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Id.
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his appeal but was unable to do so because he was mentally ill.8 Tom
Brunker, an assistant Utah Attorney General, observed, "The right to
competence [on appeal] is an ongoing issue nationally." 9 Judge Dee Benson
decided Lafferty's proceedings were taking too long and denied the stay,
stating, "This could go on forever. If you can find and come up with
different theories of his mental state ... nothing will ever get done ... there

has to be an end to this."' 0 The stay was denied. Lafferty's appeal will go
on without him for the sake of judicial efficiency.
A right to assist counsel on appeal for Lafferty is not widely supported
because it has long been assumed that lawyers alone are responsible for
marshaling arguments on appeal." Courts recognizing a right to assist

8. Id. Lafferty's attorney, Ken Murray, said, "This is a serious, make or break
decision in this case, because if we have to go forward ... we could miss some very
critical issues." Id.
9. Dennis Romboy, Death-Row Inmate Ron Lafferty Seeks Right to Competency in
Federal Appeals Process, DESERET NEWS, July 11, 2010, http://www.deseretnews.com/
article/700047006/Death-row-inmate-Ron-Lafferty-seeks-right-to-competency-infederal-appeals-process.html?pg-all.
10. See Morgan, supra note 1 ("Benson said the competence issue, which has already
stalled the case for more than a year, has already been addressed at the state level and will
only further delay court proceedings").
11. See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards §7-5.4 (1984). This section
provides:
(b) Mental incompetence of the defendant at time of appeal from conviction
in a criminal case should not prohibit the continuation of such appeal as to
matters deemed by counsel or by the court to be appropriate.
(i) If, following the conviction of the defendant in a criminal case, there
should arise a good faith doubt about the mental competence of the defendant
during the time of appeal, counsel for the state or the defendant should make
such doubt known to the court and include it in the record.
(ii) Counsel for the defendant should proceed to prosecute the appeal on
behalf of the defendant despite the defendant's incompetence and should raise
on such appeal all issues deemed by counsel to be appropriate.
(c) Mental incompetence of the defendant during the time of appeal shall be
considered adequate cause, upon a showing of prejudice, to permit the
defendant to raise, in a later appeal or action for post-conviction relief, any
matter not raised on the initial appeal because of the defendant's
incompetence.
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counsel on appeal order competency determinations and stay the
proceedings upon a finding of incompetency, but not for an indefinite period
of time.12 Unfortunately, the notion that these procedures delay the criminal
appeals process prevents broad endorsement of a right to assist counsel.
This Comment argues that a right to assist counsel on appeal protects the
integrity of the criminal justice system and should not be sacrificed for the
sake of speedy appellate review.
Mental illness pervades the criminal justice system. More than half "of
state correctional systems responding to a survey on inmate mental health
reported that 15 percent or more of their inmate population had a diagnosed
mental illness."' In the capital punishment context, mental illness affects

12. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits embraced a right to assist counsel on appeal until
the U.S. Supreme Court overruled them. See Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329 (6th Cir.
2011) (holding that habeas proceedings challenging a capital sentence should be stayed
until the petitioner is competent to proceed), abrogatedby Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct.
696 (2013); Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2003) (creating a
statutory right to competency in federal post conviction proceedings). Wisconsin,
Florida, and Illinois have endorsed a right to assist counsel on appeal. See State v. Debra
A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 738 (1994) (recognizing a statutory right to competency in state
post conviction claims in the noncapital context); Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873, 875
(Fla. 1998); People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1189-90 (111. 1990). California, Arizona,
Missouri, Texas, and Michigan have rejected a right to assist counsel on appeal. See
People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 413 (Cal. 1992); State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 878 (Ariz.
1991); Brock v. State, 242 S.W.3d 430, 432-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Ex parte Mines, 26
S.W.3d 910, 912-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); People v. Newton, 394 N.W.2d 463, 466
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986); see also Hannah Robertson Miller, A "Meaningless Ritual": How
the Lack of a Post-conviction Competency Standard Deprives the Mentally Ill Effective
Habeas Review in Texas, 87 TEX. L. REv. 267, 276 (2008).
13.
930).

Amicus Brief Utah et al. at 3, Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) (No. 10-

14. Jeffrey Metzner, M.D. & Jamie Fellner, Esq, Solitary Confinement and Mental
Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. OF AM. AcAD. OF
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 104, 105 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/relatedmaterial/Solitary/o20Confinement%20and%2Mental%20Illne
ss%20in%20US%20Prisons.pdf.
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between 10% and 70% of inmates.' 5 Prison conditions alone can exacerbate
mental illness, although many of these individuals arrive on death row with a
history of psychological problems. On death row, where prisoners are held
in solitary confinement, the suicide rate, according to data from 1995, is
about five times the rate of suicide in the United States as a whole.17
The prevalence of mental illness in prisons indicates that a great number
of inmates are unable to participate in appellate proceedings. Schizophrenia,
depression, and substance abuse are the more common psychiatric problems
Symptoms of schizophrenia include delusions and
among inmates.
hallucinations, a lack of content in speech, and deficits in cognition and
memory.19
These impairments can drastically alter a prisoner's
understanding of the proceedings. For example, the schizophrenic prisoner
facing execution in Carter v. Bradshaw believed he could not be put to death
unless he volunteered for it- "an irreversibly dangerous false belief,"
according to the court.20 Depression, although not a psychotic disorder like
schizophrenia, can equally distort an inmate's perception of the situation.
Inmates suffering from depression experience feelings of hopelessness and

15. Dominic Rupprecht, Compelling Choice. Forcibly Medicating Death Row
Inmates to Determine Whether They Wish to Pursue Collateral Relief, 114 PENN ST. L.

REV. 333, 334 (2009).
16. See David Wallace-Wells, What Is Death Row Syndrome?, SLATE, Feb. 1, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/explainer/2005/02/whatis death-row_
syndrome.html.
17. David Lester & Christine Tartaro, Suicide on Death Row, 47 J. OF FORENSIC ScI.
5 (2002).
18.

Mark Weisenmiller, Texas Death Row Suicide Underscores Stress, INTER PRESS

SERVICE NEWS AGENCY,

Nov. 6, 2011,

http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=35385

("Some of the more common psychiatric problems affecting death row inmates,
according to Metzner, are schizophrenia, depression, substance abuse, and 'probably
some history with head trauma."').
19. The Diagnosis, Symptoms, and Causes of Schizophrenia, NAT'L ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL
HEALTH,
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfin?Section= Schizophrenia9&

Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfim&ContentlD= 117958 (last visited

Mar. 2, 2013).
20.

Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329, 334 (6th Cir. 2011).
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suicidal thoughts and are at risk of withdrawing from the appeals process
and accepting execution.2 1
Most damaging of all, the symptoms of schizophrenia and depression can
include forgetfulness and difficulty making decisions, planning for the
future, and organizing thoughts, which can disrupt the ability to rationally
communicate with counsel, thereby preventing the prisoner from alerting
counsel to exculpatory facts known only to the prisoner. 22 Even when
rational communication with counsel is possible, schizophrenia and
depression often impair memory, rendering the prisoner incapable of
recalling important facts that could prove error at trial or even actual
innocence. The result is that prisoners struggling with mental illness cannot
adequately defend themselves at a juncture when that is exactly what they
should be doing. 23
Acknowledging the effects of mental illness on the criminal justice
system, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue at opposite ends of
the process, requiring criminal defendants to be competent at trial and upon
execution. However, a right to competency at the appeals stage has been

21. See Lucile Malandain, For US. Death Row Inmates, a Long Wait for Execution,
2010),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
AFP
(Apr.
17,
ALeqM5hOcnlbXU7WNbPOJN80LCNIVFa7A ("Haney, an expert on prisoners held in
isolation, said death row inmates held for years are prone to depression and mental illness
and can become extremely distrustful and completely apathetic. Some 'become so
dismayed and despondent that they actually give up,' he told AFP. 'I've seen some
clients who've been on death row for over 20 years. They simply become wound down
by the deprivation, wound down by the degradation and wound down by the isolation.
As a result, in some instances they simply give up the way they live and decide that they
can't endure this any longer, even if there is a possibility that enduring it a little longer
would result in their sentence being overturned."').
22.

See Daniel Pendick, Depression and Memory, MEMORY Loss & THE BRAIN,

(2001), http://www.memorylossonline.com/summer200l/depression.html ("Memory is
but one of a suite of higher or 'executive' brain functions hobbled by depression.");
Schizophrenia Memory Diferences, BBC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/health/7289245.stm (noting that schizophrenia "is often linked with enduring
memory problems.").
23. As Blackstone stated, "and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory,
execution shall be stayed, for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the
prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or
execution." 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 24-25 (1769).
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recognized only on a piecemeal basis. 2 4 The U.S. Supreme Court has said
that a prisoner must be competent to waive the right to post-conviction
counsel or the right to appeal generally. 25 A right to assist counsel on
appeal-for someone in Lafferty's position-has not been upheld.26 A trend
toward recognizing a right to assist counsel on appeal had been occurring at
the federal level,2 and many states believed that such a right delays the
criminal appeals process. However, the recent Supreme Court decision
Ryan v. Gonzales held that 18 U.S.C. § 3599, which provides the right to
counsel in federal habeas proceedings, does not also provide the right to
suspend the proceedings when the prisoner is adjudged incompetent.28
According to the Court, an indefinite stay for a prisoner unlikely to regain

24. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-410 (1986) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of an incompetent individual); Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, 378 (1966) ("[tlhe conviction of an accused person while he is legally
incompetent violates due process").
25. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313-314 (1966) (holding that a defendant's
decision to forgo further proceedings requires an evaluation of the defendant's capacity);
see also Hannah Robertson Miller, A "Meaningless Ritual": How the Lack of a Postconviction Competency Standard Deprives the Mentally Ill Effective Habeas Review in
Texas, 87 TEX. L. REv. 267, 276 (2008) ("All criminal defendants must be competent to
plead guilty, to waive counsel, and to stand trial. In the capital context, defendants must
be competent to waive direct appeals, to waive state and federal post-conviction counsel,
to withdraw final appeals, and to be executed").
26. California, Arizona, Missouri, Texas, and Michigan have all rejected a right to
assist counsel on appeal. See People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 413 (Cal. 1992); State v.
White, 815 P.2d 869, 878 (Ariz. 1991); Brock v. State, 242 S.W.3d 430, 432-33 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007); Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 912-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); People v.
Newton, 394 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
27. See In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated by Ryan v.
Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013); Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying
the Rohan rule to appeals); Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2003)
(creating a statutory right to competency in federal post conviction proceedings),
abrogatedby Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
28.

Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 702-06 (2013).
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competence causes undue delays. 2 9 However, the Court noted that district
courts have discretion to issue stays for incompetent prisoners.30
Proceeding in four parts, this Comment argues that a right to assist
counsel on appeal protects the integrity of the criminal justice system and
should not be sacrificed for the sake of speedy appellate review. Part I
provides a background on competency rights throughout the system with an
emphasis on the lack of a right to assist counsel on appeal. It considers the
prevailing notion that prisoners have no role to play on appeal and explains
why this view is flawed. Part II examines case law treatment of a right to
assist counsel on appeal and analyzes its impact on the efficiency of the
criminal appeals process. Part III disputes the argument that a right to assist
counsel on appeal contravenes the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1966 (AEDPA), a federal law designed to streamline federal habeas
review. Part IV offers a proposal for reducing delays if this right were more
uniformly recognized.
I. COMPETENCY RIGHTS AT THE TRIAL, APPEAL, AND EXECUTION STAGES

In Pate v. Robinson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a right to
competence at trial is essential to due process of law.31 An accused is
incompetent to stand trial if he does not understand the proceedings and is
unable to rationally communicate with counsel. This right recognizes the
need for the defendant to assist counsel with developing the facts and
formulating a case theory, as well as the need to make important decisions,
such as whether to testify or whether to waive a jury trial. At the last stage
29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1960) ("The failure to observe procedures
adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to
stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial." Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 172 (1975)). The right to competence at trial also is rooted in the Sixth
Amendment. See Brief in Opposition at 26, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-930) ("The Framers did not include a right to trial competency in the Sixth
Amendment, but this Court [the U.S. Supreme Court] found such a right vital to protect
the right to counsel.") (quoting Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir.
2003)).
32. See Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 259, 265 (2009) ("At trial a defendant will need to make reasoned decisions in
light of possible consequences, such as whether to testify, waive a jury, or raise certain
defenses.").
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of the system, as determined by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Ford v. Wainwright, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an
incompetent individual.3 3 Unlike the standard for measuring competency at
trial, Justice Powell's concurrence in Ford, commonly accepted as
articulating the competency standard at execution, does not conceive of the
inmate's ability to assist counsel as a requirement. 34 Instead, Justice Powell
wrote that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of "those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to
suffer it." 35

Between the trial and execution stages, the criminal appeals process
involves a number of different venues that take place over a long period of
time. Generally, upon a conviction and a death sentence, a direct appeal is
initiated in the state's highest court. If the judgment is affirmed, the prisoner
has the right to seek state post-conviction review, sometimes called a
collateral attack, for the purpose of considering errors at the trial level.36
Unlike a direct appeal, post-conviction review is not limited to the trial
record.37 Typical claims at this stage include prosecutorial misconduct and
ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The state post-conviction review of the
court's decision can be appealed. At that point, the prisoner has exhausted

33.

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986).

34. The ability to assist counsel was offered by the Justices in Ford as a standard for
determining competency at the execution stage, but this definition of competency did not
gain traction. See generally Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford and Panetti:
Execution Competence and the Capacity to Assist Counsel, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 309
(2009).
35.

Ford,477 U.S. 399 at 422.

36. See The Criminal Appeals Process, Az. ATTORNEY GEN. OFFICE
http://www.azag.gov/victims-rights/Brochures/CriminalAppealsProcess.pdf (last visited

Mar. 2, 2013).
37.

Id.

38. See Hannah Robertson Miller, A "MeaninglessRitual": How the Lack ofa Postconviction Competency StandardDeprives the Mentally Ill Effective Habeas Review in
Texas, 87 TEX. L. REv. 267, 280 (2008) ("It is habeas counsel that is responsible for
reinvestigating the case based on such claims as prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective
assistance of counsel, actual innocence, or other facts previously unknown that might
warrant a sentence less than death.").
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state remedies and can file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 3 9
Federal habeas claims must allege violations of federal constitutional law
and are subject to extensive procedural rules under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 40
Unlike competency rights at trial and execution, competency rights on
appeal are limited. In Rees v. Peyton, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with a

prisoner who wished to withdraw his petition for certiorari and accept
execution. 41 The Court held that those who "volunteer for death" must be
competent.42 Thus, capital defendants must be competent to waive direct
appeals, to waive state and federal post-conviction counsel, and to withdraw
final appeals. 43 Despite these holdings, a right to assist counsel on appeal
does not exist because of the assumption that the strictly legal nature of
appeals obviates the need for any communication between prisoner and
counsel." Proponents of this view argue that the prisoner has no role to play
since it is the attorney's job alone to decide which issues to pursue on
appeal.45 However, while it is true that appellate work product relies less on

39.

See

The

Criminal Appeals

Process, Az.

ATTORNEY

GEN.

OFFICE,

http://www.azag.gov/victims-rights/Brochures/CriminalAppealsProcess.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2, 2013).
40. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
41.

Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 312 (1966).

42.

Id.

43. See Miller, supra note 38, at 276-77. ("All criminal defendants must be
competent to plead guilty, to waive counsel, and to stand trial. In the capital context,
defendants must also be competent to waive direct appeals, to waive state and federal
postconviction counsel, to withdraw final appeals, and to be executed.").
44. See People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 414 (Cal. 1992); Fisher v. State, 736 P.2d
1003, 1015 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). In rejecting a right to assist counsel on appeal, both
cases cited the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. See ABA Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards, supra note 11.
45. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) ("For judges to second-guess
reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every
'colorable' claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and
effective advocacy that underlies Anders. Nothing in the Constitution or our
interpretation of that document requires such a standard.")
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the defendant than does trial preparation, prisoners may still assist in
developing claims that have been identified by counsel from the trial record.
In any event, the underlying presumption itself is flawed because unlike
direct appeal, post-conviction review is not limited to the trial record.46
Most disputes on post-conviction review include claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, all of which
require the disclosure of facts beyond the record that are, in most cases,
known only to the prisoner.4 7 As the Seventh Circuit has stated, "The
petitioner was at his trial; his current lawyers were not. He may-if mentally
competent-be able to convey to his lawyers a better sense of the alleged
misbehavior of the prosecutor and of defense counsel than the trial transcript
and other documentation provide." 48 For example, the incompetent
petitioner in Nash v. Ryan, a recent Ninth Circuit case, was granted a stay on
appeal because his ineffective assistance of counsel claim required his firsthand insight into what happened at trial.49 Several attorneys assisted Nash in
prior appeals and his appellate counsel's attempts to contact those attorneys

46. See The Criminal Appeals Process, Az. ATTORNEY GEN. OFFICE,
http://www.azag.gov/victims-ights/Brochures/CriminalAppealsProcess.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2, 2013).
47. See Miller, supra note 38, at 280 ("It is habeas counsel that is responsible for
reinvestigating the case based on such claims as prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective
assistance of counsel, actual innocence, or other facts previously unknown that might
warrant a sentence less than death.") In regard to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, stated: "A convicted
defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify acts or omissions of
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (emphasis added). Additionally,
"Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary . . . Inquiry into counsel's conversations
with the defendant may be critical to proper assessment of counsel's investigation
decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation
decisions." Id. at 691 (emphasis added). Thus, the Strickland standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims actually demand facts outside of the record, specifically
implicating the appellant's ability to recall conversations with the trial lawyer and the
appellant's ability to precisely identify the trial lawyer's questionable behavior.
48. Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the test for post
conviction competency should be identical to the competency-to-stand-trial standard).
49. Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the Rohan rule
to appeals), abrogatedby Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
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were unsuccessful.o In the absence of a right to assist counsel on appeal,
important facts regarding Nash's claim would have never come to light,
rendering his lawyer unable to successfully represent him.51
The lack of a right to assist counsel on appeal is also inconsistent with
competency rights at trial. The right to competency at trial alone does not
sufficiently protect the mentally ill from the criminal justice system. Trial
usually lasts a matter of weeks,52 while the average amount of time spent on
federal habeas review is 17 years.53 It is improper to rely solely on trial
procedures to identify competency issues because the trial period presents a
mere snapshot of the defendant's mental state.
Mental illness is not static, and even those individuals with severe mental
health issues have moments of lucidity. 54 Symptoms of mental illness gone
unnoticed at trial may only become apparent once the prisoner is forced to
face the stress of coming to terms with a death sentence. As Judge Posner in
U.S. v. Graves observed, "Determining past as distinct from present
competence has been ruled to be infeasible when more than a few years have

50.

Id.

51. See Brock v. State, 242 S.W.3d 430 (Mo. App. 2007). In Brock, the appellate
court upheld the state post-conviction court's denial of the appellant's request for a
competency determination, stating "Because Rule 29.15 focuses on the validity of what
occurred at the trial proceeding, the '[m]ovant's present mental condition is irrelevant."
Id. at 433. The appellate court then denied the ineffective assistance of counsel claim by
crediting trial counsel's uncontested testimony that he was not ineffective. The prisoner
did not testify because he was mentally ill. Id.
52. See Philip Cook, Donna Slawson, & Lori Gries, Terry Sanford Institute of Public
Policy Duke University, The Costs of Processing Murder Cases in North Carolina 50
(May 1993), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/northcarolina.pdf (Table 6.2).
53. Emiley Morgan, Ron Lafferty Case Will Proceed While the Man's Competency is
Evaluated, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
705365658/Ron-Lafferty-case-will-proceed-while-the-mans-competency-isevaluated.html?pg=2.
54. See Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing how a
schizophrenic petitioner was "lucid, even articulate," at times, and had deteriorated
between hearings).

2013

Mental Illness on Appeal and the Right to Assist Counsel

361

elapsed since the plea."ss Accordingly, competency rights at trial do not
eliminate the need for competency rights on appeal.
Despite these arguments, the possibility that a right to assist counsel on
appeal will delay the criminal appeals process threatens recognition of the
right. 56 The next part of this Comment examines how a right to assist
counsel on appeal is treated in case law and its implications for the criminal
justice system.
II. CASE-LAW PERSPECTIVES

A. PriorLaw

State appellate courts faced with incompetency claims follow the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards on Mental Health, which instruct counsel to
proceed with the appeal or post-conviction proceeding notwithstanding the
prisoner's mental illness. 57 A defendant's incompetency is to be noted on
the record so that counsel can, in a later proceeding, show cause and present
claims not previously asserted because of the incompetency. As Professor
Quinn explains, "The Standard and its commentary . . . state conclusorily
that 'spread[ing] on the record' questions of capacity will allow the
defendant in a later proceeding-such as a federal habeas corpus petitionto raise issues that may not have been raised because of incompetency."
Fisher v. State and People v. Kelly59 illustrate how this approach invites
later proceedings and delays the criminal appeals process.
In Fisher v. State, the court dealt with the incompetency of a prisoner
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.6 0 On appeal from a
denial of post-conviction review, counsel asserted that Fisher's emotional

55.

United States v. Graves, 98 F.3d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a

defendant who pled guilty to three counts of armed robbery was entitled to a competency

hearing before he entered such a plea).
56.

See Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).

57. See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, supra note 11; see also
Brock v. State, 242 S.W.3d 430 (Mo. App. 2007).
58.

See Fisher v. State, 845 P.2d 1272 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).

59.

See People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1992).

60. Fisher, 845 P.2d at 1278-79 (finding that a death-sentenced inmate did not need
to be competent during the direct appeals process).
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disorder rendered him unable to assist in the claims. The court ignored the
competency issue by relying on the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on
Mental Health, stating:
Because convicted defendants, like parties to appellate litigation in
general, do not participate in appeal proceedings, mental
incompetence rarely affects the fairness or accuracy of appellate
decisions.. .the standard envisions that appellate or post-conviction
review procedures will be carried to completion despite an
appellant's mental incompetence, provided [that if] it later appears
that matters important to review could not be presented because of
mental incompetence, they should be considered in postconviction review proceedings.62
A footnote reveals the author of the opinion disagreed with the holding
and was concerned that ignoring the competency issue would result in
further proceedings.63 According to the author, a competency determination
would have promoted "finali% of judgment at the state level. . . thereby
minimizing collateral attacks."
People v. Kelly demonstrates the problems associated with ignoring the
author's advice from Fisher.65 On direct appeal from a conviction of first61.

Id. at 1275.

62.

Id.

63. See id. at 1277 n.4. ("A post-conviction proceeding before this Court represents
the final appeal an appellant can pursue before he has exhausted his state remedies. I
therefore find it an appropriate vehicle through which the issue of appellate competency
may be raised. Such procedure would ensure that a post-conviction appellant is given the
opportunity, upon a proper showing, to raise any pertinent matter not previously raised
because of his incompetence, and will promote finality of judgment at the state level,
thereby minimizing collateral attacks.. .It is my opinion that this case should be remanded
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether any relevant issue has not been raised
during the appellate process because of incompetence. However, the text of this opinion
represents the view of a majority of this Court.").
64. Id. A year after the appellate court's opinion, Fisher filed a petition for federal
habeas review. The federal district court found that Fisher received ineffective assistance
of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial and granted relief as to the sentence of
death. The court upheld the conviction itself because Fisher failed to demonstrate
prejudice as a result of counsel's mishandling of the mental illness claims. Fisher
appealed and the Tenth Circuit remanded for a new trial. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d
1283, 1289-90 (10th Cir. 2002).
65.

People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 412 (Cal. 1992).
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degree murder, rape, and robbery, and a death sentence, Kelly claimed the
appeal should be stayed until he regained competence.66 The court denied
Kelly's claims and affirmed the lower court's judgment by relying on the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Mental Health noted in Fisher,stating:
For these reasons, current counsel can and should seek to
challenge the judgment even if defendant is currently incompetent.
If, in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, counsel make [sic] a
specific showing why specified contentions require defendant's
ability to cooperate, and why the necessary information cannot be
obtained from other sources, we will consider the question at that
time. 67
A year after his conviction was affirmed at the state level, a federal district
court stayed Kelly's execution in order for counsel to be appointed and for a
competency determination to be made.68 But the statute of limitations on
filing the federal habeas claim expired before the court made its competency
determination. The State argued the stay of execution should be lifted and
the Ninth Circuit (Kelly III) agreed. A dissenting judge argued that tolling
the statute of limitations was appropriate because the competency
determination had not been made, noting, "It is true, as the majority
emphasizes, that these proceedings have been pending for several years.
However, it is evident from the record that most of the delay has been
caused by the district court's attempts to grapple with Kelly's mental
problems.",69 On en banc review (Kelly V), the court agreed with the dissent
and stayed the execution.70
As Fisherwarned, the Kelly court's reliance on the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards on Mental Health resulted in further proceedings regarding the
prisoner's mental health.7 1 Ignoring the competency issue at the early stages

66.

Id. at 412-14.

67.

Id. at 414.

68. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal. (Kelly III), 127 F.3d 782, 783
(9th Cir. 1997).

69.

Id. at 788.

70.

Calderon, 163 F.3d at 543.

71. See Mae C. Quinn, ReconceptualizingCompetence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 259, 280 (2009) ("The Standard and its commentary instead state conclusorily
that "spread[ing] on the record" questions of capacity will allow the defendant in a later
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prevented identification and treatment of the mental illness, which resulted
in serious delays on federal habeas review.
In a break from the Fisher and Kelly tradition, the court in State v. Debra
A.E. ordered competency evaluations and proposed that if the claims
required the prisoner's input, the time limit for filing them could be
continued.72 Ordering competency determinations is important for reducing
delays because, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, it is difficult to
retrospectively establish incompetency.73 The Debra court concluded, "The
process we prescribe . . . satisfies the interests of alleged incompetent

defendants and the public in expeditin post-conviction relief and reaching a
final determination on the merits.
State courts adopting the Debra
approach to incompetency can prevent later proceedings on the issue and
thereby streamline the criminal appeals process. 75

proceeding-such as a federal habeas corpuspetition-to raise issues that may not have
been raised because of incompetency." (emphasis added)).
72.

Id. at 734.

73. See In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 2010). "The Supreme Court
has emphasized that such retrospective competency determinations are inherently
difficult even 'under the most favorable circumstances."' Id. See also Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975) (viewing these retrospective competency
determinations with disfavor); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that when a court erroneously fails to hold a contemporaneous competency
hearing "it often may be impossible to repair the damage retrospectively") (superseded on
other grounds by statute as described in McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
74.

State v. Debra, A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 736 (1994).

75. Id. at 734-36. The court's rules can be summarized as follows: (1) If in doubt, a
post-conviction court should rule on an appellant's competency so that counsel can
appoint a temporary guardian to make decisions that are committed by law to the
defendant personally, not counsel, such as whether or not to pursue post-conviction
relief. A ruling on competency also insures that counsel is able to create a record
reflecting the incompetency should the appellant seek to raise issues later that were
precluded by the incompetency. (2) Post-conviction review should proceed without the
appellant's input if the claims are on the record, the claims do not require the appellant's
input, and going forward with the proceedings would not put the appellant at risk. (3) If
the claims require the incompetent appellant's input, the time limit for filing a motion for
post-conviction review may be continued.
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B. The FederalTrend Toward Recognizing A Right To Assist Counsel On
Appeal

Recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit recognized a right to assist
counsel on appeal, culminating in a reversal at the U.S. Supreme Court. In
Rohan v. ex. rel Woodford, the landmark case on this point, the defendant,
Gates, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 76 After
exhausting state remedies, Gates initiated federal habeas review, claiming
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a competency hearing and
for presenting inadequate mitigating evidence of his upbringing.77
At the time of filing, Gates believed he was a beneficiary of the Howard
Hughes78 trust fund and that state officials were conspiring to assassinate
him in order to deny him his inheritance. 79 A psychiatrist wrote, "His
unwillingness stems from his paranoid lack of trust and certainty he is being
persecuted. His attorneys have attested to his inability to cooperate."so The
state questioned whether he was malingering, a medical term used to
describe the act of exaggerating or fabricating symptoms, but determined he
was not. Upon concluding that Gates's input could potentially bolster his
claims, the court stayed the proceedings until he could competently proceed
by inferring a right to assist counsel from 13 U.S.C. § 3599, which provides
a right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. 8 2 The court reasoned that a
right to counsel is not meaningful if the appellant is unable to assist
counsel.83

76. Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by
Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
77.

Id. at 805.

78. Howard Hughes was a famous businessman, filmmaker, and aviator. One of the
wealthiest men in the world, his death in 1976 provoked numerous fake versions of his
will.
79. Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by
Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S.Ct. 696 (2013).
80.

Id. at 806.

8 1. Id.
82.

18 U.S.C. § 3599 (a)(2) (2006).

83. Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 807-10 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by
Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013); see also Blair v. Cullen, No. CV 99-6859, 2010
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In short, the Rohan rule mandated a competency determination if there is
a threshold showing of incompetency. A stay would be issued if the
petitioner was found incompetent and had raised claims that could
"potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally, whether or
not counsel can identify with precision the information sought." Rohan
marked a dramatic shift in thinking about the various roles counsel and
prisoner play on post-conviction review. But in accordance with current
attitudes toward appeals,84 Rohan was thought to be limited to fact-based
claims such as Gates's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.85 Rohan did
not occur in the context of an appeal, but rather concerned district court
proceedings.
Nash v. Ryan, another Ninth Circuit case, was the first to apply the Rohan
rule to an appeal. 8 6 In 1983, Nash was convicted of first-degree murder,
armed robbery, aggravated assault, and theft, and was sentenced to death.87
Counsel appealed a denial of his petition for federal habeas review and
certified for appeal two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including
a failure to "investigate and present at the penalty phase available mitigation
evidence, including evidence concerning Nash's mental illness, character,
background, and family history."88 Shortly after appealing, Nash began to
WL 5563896 at *20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2010) ("Because federal statute secures the right
to counsel in capital habeas proceedings, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and because 'federal
habeas corpus has a particularly important role to play in promoting fundamental fairness
in the imposition of the death penalty,' McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994), the
Ninth Circuit has found that meaningful assistance of counsel is essential in securing the
right of competence. The Congressional mandate that habeas petitioners be afforded
counsel can only be fully enforced if the federal courts ensure that the condemned has the
capacity for rational communication and is competent to provide meaningful assistance to
his counsel.").
84. See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, supranote 11.
85. See In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The district court
denied Gonzales's motion for a competency determination under Rohan because
'[Gonzales's] properly-exhausted claims are record-based and/or resolvable as a matter of
law, irrespective of [his] capacity for rational communication with counsel,' and
therefore 'cannot benefit from [his] personal input').
86. Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Ryan v.
Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
87.

Id. at 1050.

88.

Id. at 1055.
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suffer from a delusional disorder that caused him to experience auditory
hallucinations, as well as grandiose and paranoid delusions. 9 Nash's
symptoms made it impossible for him to rationally communicate with
counsel. 90 The Ninth Circuit held the insight Nash could provide regarding
the earlier proceedings might be helpful in ways that counsel could not
identify because of his alleged incompetence, noting that several attorneys
had assisted Nash over the course of post-conviction litigation.9 Applying
the Rohan rule to appeals, the court stated, "[w]hile an appeal is recordbased, that does not mean that a habeas petitioner in a capital case is
relegated to a nonexistent role." 92 Accordingly, a stay under Nash requires
only that a petitioner identify claims that "could potentially benefit from
such communication with counsel," even if the proceeding is entirely based
on the record.93 Nash left little room for doubt that prisoners have a right to
assist counsel on appeal.
Rohan and Nash were endorsed by In re Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit's

recent emergency mandamus decision to reverse a district court's refusal to
issue a Rohan stay for defendant Gonzales, a man suffering from a psychotic
disorder that interferes with his ability to rationally communicate with
counsel.94 In contrast to Fisher and Kelly, the appellate court justified its
adoption of the Rohan rule by reference to promoting efficiency on appeal:

. 89.

90.

Id. at 1057.

Id. at 1057-58.

91. Id. at 1056 (quoting Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 818 (9th
Cir. 2003)), abrogated by Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) ("Perhaps there are
cases where an incompetent petitioner's counsel knows exactly what he needs to know
and can't find out. Surely, however, those are the exception rather than the rule.").
92.

Id. at 1050.

93.

Id. at 1055.

94. See In re Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 2010) rev'd, Ryan v.
Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013). Gonzales was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. Upon filing a federal habeas claim alleging that his Sixth Amendment rights were
violated when the trial judge was openly hostile to him and refused to recuse himself, the
district court granted the government's motion to transfer Gonzales to a hospital for a
mental health assessment. A psychologist's report concluded that Gonzales suffered
from a "genuine psychotic disorder" and was "currently . . . unable to communicate
rationally for any extended period of time, such as would be required by a legal
proceeding." However, the district court refused to stay the proceedings on the theory
that Gonzales input was unnecessary because his claims were entirely based on the
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[T]he district court's erroneous refusal to stay proceedings in this
capital case raises the prospect of months, if not years, of habeas
proceedings that will almost certainly be vacated or reversal ... [A

reversal] will help to 'assist the [district courts] in their efforts to
ensure that the judicial system operates in an orderly and efficient
manner.' It will do so by preventing district courts from wasting
considerable resources on capital habeas proceedings in which a
petitioner is incapable, as a result of incompetency, of availing
himself of the assistance of counsel. Granting the writ in this case
thus directly serves the fundamental purpose of supervisory
mandamus- promoting the efficiency of the judicial system. 95
In response, the state of Arizona petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
review of In re Gonzales, urging that the Rohan rule did not promote
efficiency on appeal, but instead, created delays in contravention of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 96 An amicus
brief on behalf of fifteen states was filed in support of the petitioner,
expressing similar concerns that a right to assist counsel on appeal causes
delays.97 On January 8, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case
Ryan v. Gonzales, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3599, which provides a right to
counsel in federal habeas proceedings, does not also provide a right to
suspend the proceedings when the prisoner is adjudged incompetent. The
Gonzales decision overruled Rohan and Nash, as far as those cases relied on
18 U.S.C. § 3599 to create a right to assist counsel on appeal. The Court
noted AEDPA does not deprive district courts of their equitable power to
issue stays for incompetent prisoners,9 but noted that an indefinite stay for a
record. Gonzales filed an emergency petition for a writ of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit
stayed the matter until it decided Nash, and then used its holding in Nash to find that
Gonzales had a right to assist counsel on appeal, noting that, like Nash's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, Gonzales's judicial bias claim could potentially benefit from
the "firsthand insight into the earlier proceedings" that a competent petitioner would be
able to provide. Id.
95.

Id. at 1247-48 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 10-930).
97. Amici are Utah, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington. Amicus Brief of Utah et al., Ryan, 623 F.3d 1242 (No. 10-930).
98.

Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 702-06 (2013).
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prisoner unlikely to regain competence frustrates AEDPA's purpose.100
Courts are now poised to accommodate incompetent prisoners without
concern for delays.
III. THE RIGHT TO ASSIST COUNSEL ON APPEAL DOES NOT CAUSE DELAYS
A. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 (AEDPA)

District courts exercising discretion in this area should not be concerned
about delays because the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1966 ("AEDPA") actually support the early adjudication of
competency claims. In 1996, Congress responded to concerns that the
capital punishment system is delayed and amended the federal habeas corpus
statute by passage of the AEDPA. 01 AEDPA limits the availability of
federal habeas relief for all habeas petitioners.102 Federal courts were able to
review state court judgments de novo before the passage of AEDPA.o 3
Now, district courts may interfere with state court decisions only if the
decision is both erroneous and unreasonable, 104 but AEDPA does not
foreclose a stay for incompetent prisoners. AEDPA's statute of limitations
provision requires federal habeas claims to be made within a year of the
conviction when finalized on direct appeal (the statute of limitations is tolled
The U.S. Supreme Court has held
during state post-conviction review).
that the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled under extraordinary

99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
102. Jonathan Kirshbaum, Keeping Track of the Great Writ for New York State
Prisoners, Habeas Corpus FAQ, HABEAS CoRPus BLOG, http://habeascorpusblog.
typepad.com/habeas corpus blog/habeas-corpus-faq.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
103.

Miller, supra note 38, at 285.

104.

Id.

105. Jonathan Kirshbaum, Keeping Track of the Great Writ for New York State
Prisoners, Habeas Corpus FAQ, HABEAS CORPUS BLOG, http://habeascorpusblog.
typepad.com/habeas corpus-blog/habeas-corpus-faq.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
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circumstances, o0and the Ninth Circuit has confirmed that mental incapacity
is an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling.' 0 7 Therefore,
competency claims on federal habeas review do not cause impermissible
delays. They only toll the statute of limitations. Furthermore, federal
habeas petitioners only have one opportunity to assert their claims because
AEDPA bars successive petitions. A recent California district court noted
the rule against successive petitions precludes prisoners from bringing new
claims not previously asserted because of incompetency and therefore
"actually support[s] the need to grant a stay of proceedings when a capital
habeas petitioner is incompetent."o In sum, district courts exercising their
discretion in this area can accommodate incompetent prisoners within the
confines of AEDPA and without concern for delays.
B. Amicus Briefin In re Gonzales (2010)

State courts should also recognize a right to assist counsel on appeal
without concern for delays. In their brief in support of the petitioner, Amici
asserted that a right to assist counsel on appeal causes delays that frustrate
Amici's interest in the finality of their judgments.' 09 Amici cited several
cases as examples of the allegedly significant delays caused by competency
determinations and Rohan stays. However, Amici failed to appreciate that
stays, on the whole, are rare." 0 Only a few stays have been granted in the

106.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010).

107.

See Rohan, 334 F.3d at 814-15 (citations omitted), abrogated by Ryan v.

Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 706 (2013).
108. See Hill v. Ayers, No. 4-94-CV-641 2008 WL 683422, *1 (N.D. Cal. March 10,
2008) ("Respondent contends that these proceedings should not be stayed even if
Petitioner is incompetent because of the limitations on habeas relief established by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996). However, there is no support for the argument that AEDPA's
limitations on the Court's power to grant relief somehow diminish a capital habeas
petitioner's right to counsel while pursuing habeas relief Indeed, Rohan makes clear that
AEDPA's restrictions on successive petitions actually support the need to grant a stay of
proceedings when a capital habeas petitioner is incompetent.") Rohan, 334 F.3d at 81617.
109. See Brief in Opposition at 5, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 10-930).
110.

See id.
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eight years since Rohan."1 Of these, none were suspended indefinitely. 112
Underlying Amici's concerns is their failure to acknowledge that other
factors more prominently contribute to delays in the criminal justice
system.113 According to Justice Stevens, "it may be appropriate to
distinguish, for example, among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner's
abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a
petitioner's legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or
deliberate action by the State." 14 It is less clear to what extent a right to
assist counsel on appeal contributes to delays. For instance, Debra and In re
Gonzales explicitly suggest that endorsing a right to assist counsel on appeal
may actually prevent later proceedings and further delays." 5
AEDPA also provides state courts with an incentive to conduct
AEDPA's procedural default provision
competency determinations.
provides that any claims not asserted at every level of state review are barred
from federal habeas review.' 16 The requirement can be overcome if the
inmate can show "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law" or that failure to consider the claims will
result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."' 17 Thus, if counsel presents
a claim on federal habeas review that was not asserted at the state level-a
likely occurrence if the state followed the ABA Criminal Justice on Mental
Health Standards and ignored the competency issue (which constitutes cause
for default)-the federal court is likely to send the prisoner back to the state
court so the claims can be exhausted.' 18 Therefore, AEDPA provides state
courts with an incentive for conducting competency determinations.
111.

Id.

112.

Id. at 27.

113.

Id. at 26.

114. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1997) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari); see also Miller, supra note 38, at 274.
115.

State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 736 (1994).

116.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1) (2008).

117.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).

118. See Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 259, 280 (2009) ("The Standard and its commentary instead state conclusorily
that "spread[ing] on the record" questions of capacity will allow the defendant in a later
proceeding-such as a federal habeas corpus petition-to raise issues that may not have
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Ironically, Amici's unwillingness to embrace the right to assist counsel on
appeal at the state level actually results in more litigation at the federal level,
as illustrated by Fisher and Kelly. Amici therefore contributes to the very
delays they seek to prevent by ignoring competency issues at the state level.
While it is possible that some prisoners experience mental illness for the first
time at the federal habeas stage, it is likely that incompetent federal habeas
petitioners were incompetent during state proceedings. In fact, of the
thirteen federal habeas cases cited by Amici in support of their delay
argument, nine concerned prisoners with a prior history of mental health
issues.120 In four of the cases, state post-conviction courts had refused to
grant competency determinations on the grounds that no right to assist
counsel on appeal exists.'2 1

been raised because of incompetency.") (emphasis added); see also ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 11; Miller, supra note 38, at 285.
119. People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1992); Fisher v. State, 736 P.2d 1003, 101112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
120. Amicus Brief of Utah et al. at 4-5 n.2, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-930); see Ferguson v. State, 789 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 2001) (describing
the state post-conviction court's denial of a right to assist counsel on appeal); Clayton v.
Roper, 515 F.3d 784, 789 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that the defendant was prescribed antipsychotics while awaiting trial); Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2007)
(discussing appellant's mental condition at earlier hearing); Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d
910, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (denying a right to assist counsel on appeal); Nash v.
Schriro, No. CV-97-1104 2006 WL 1889589 at *8 (D. Ariz. July 7, 2006) (noting that
Nash had been committed to a mental hospital earlier in life); People v. Blair, 115 P.3d
1145, 1190-91 (Cal. 1995) (citing People v. Kelly to deny competency determination on
appeal); Lewis v. Ayers, No. CIV S-02-0013 2010 WL 4630246 at *16 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
8, 2010) (describing physician's opinion that appellant was insane at the time of the
offense); Rogers v. McDaniel, No. 3:02-cv-0342, 2008 WL 820088 at *7 (D. Nev. March
24, 2008) (denying the existence of a right to assist counsel at the state post-conviction

stage); Emiley Morgan, Ron Lafferty Case Will Proceed While the Man's Competency is
Evaluated, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
705365658/Ron-Lafferty-case-will-proceed-while-the-mans-competency-is-evaluated.
html?pg-2 (noting that competency was at issue during state proceedings in Lafferty v.
Turley).
121. Amicus Brief of Utah et al. at 4-5 n.2, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-930); see Ferguson v. State, 789 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 2001) ("Of
particular relevance to the instant proceedings, this Court disposed of Ferguson's request
for a stay of his post-conviction proceedings pending a determination of his
competency"); Ex parte Mines, 26 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ("In light of
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The assertion that a right to assist counsel on appeal causes delays is
without merit. District courts exercising their discretion in this area can
accommodate incompetent prisoners within the confines of AEDPA and
without regard to delays. State courts should also recognize a right to assist
counsel on appeal without concern or delays. The Amici states overstated
the prevalence of Rohan claims and failed to realize the role the state courts
play in contributing to competence-related delays. For these reasons, it is
hard to comprehend the logic behind sacrificing a right to assist counsel on
appeal for the sake of speedy federal habeas review.
IV. PREVENTING SPURIOUS CLAIMS AND PROMOTING FAIRNESS

The recognition of a right to assist counsel on appeal must be done as
prudently as possible. This section recommends proposals that expedite the
process and prevent frivolous claims of incompetency for courts embracing
a right to assist counsel on appeal.

the absence of legislative action, the statutory context, and the differences in the nature of
the rights and procedures at trial and in post-conviction proceedings, we find no
justification in inferring a statutory requirement that the applicant be mentally competent
for habeas corpus proceedings in the way that a defendant must be mentally competent
for trial."); People v. Blair, 115 P.3d 1145, 1190-91 (Cal. 2005) ("Defendant contends
that during his incarceration on death row, his mental health has deteriorated to the point
that he is unable to assist appellate or habeas corpus counsel and will be unfit to stand
trial should a retrial be ordered. With respect to the appeal, however, which is the only
proceeding that concerns us at this juncture, defendant has failed to connect his alleged
mental deficiency to any inability of his appellate counsel to present his claims on appeal.
Cf. People v. Kelly 822 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1992) [because the issues on appeal are limited to
the appellate record, the appeal may proceed despite defendant's incompetence].)
Accordingly, d,^-tnuant has failed to demonstrate that any delay prejudiced his ability to
obtain meaningful appellate review.") (citations omitted); Rogers v. McDaniel, 801 F.
Supp. 2d 1049, 1061 (D. Nev. 2011) ("Rogers also argues that he was incompetent to
proceed with his state post-conviction actions. Rogers, however, does not cite any
precedent holding that it is a violation of the federal constitutional right to due process of
law for a defendant's state post-conviction challenge to proceed while he is incompetent.
Therefore, a fundamental shortcoming of this part of Ground 3 is that Rogers has not
demonstrated that a federal right is at stake.").
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A. PreventingDilatory Tactics

In accord with Debra and the Rohan line of cases, a threshold showing of
incompetence on appeal should warrant a competency determination.' 22
Indeed, at the trial level, judges have a constitutional duty to initiate a
competency determination if the defendant shows signs of incompetency. 123
Courts can then stay the proceedings for incompetent prisoners with
procedures that prevent dilatory tactics.
The first task an incompetent prisoner may struggle with is deciding
whether or not to pursue an appeal. Under Rees, a prisoner must be
competent to waive his right to appeal.124 This decision can be crucial
because there are instances where pursuing an appeal may be risky to the
prisoner, such as when a prisoner challenges a plea bargain and risks a
Courts accommodate allegedly incompetent prisoners
higher sentence.1
with this task by equitably tolling the statute of limitations for filing a
federal habeas claim while a competency determination is made. For
example, in Calderon v. U.S. District Court (Kelly V), the Ninth Circuit
tolled the statute of limitations because a threshold showing on the record
had the court concerned about the petitioner's ability to competently make
the decision of whether to pursue an appeal.126 Even the appointment of a

122. See State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 734 at n.17 (1994) ("This 'reason to
doubt standard' is the same as provided for proceedings to determine competency to
proceed with trial.").
123. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) (stating that courts must be
ever-vigilant for signs that a defendant is not competent to stand trial).
124.

Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966).

125. See Quinn, supra note 32, at 291 ("Such risk situations are often presented in
plea cases-where a client pled guilty to a reduced charge for a reduced sentence. The
guilty plea or sentence might be challenged by appeal, but this will deprive the defendant
of the plea deal and expose him to the possibility of a higher sentence.").
126. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc) ("Where, as here, there is a threshold showing of mental incompetency, a
sufficient showing has been made for equitably tolling the statute of limitations, and we
reject Kelly III's holding to the contrary. When a putative habeas petitioner's mental
competency is at issue, and the record discloses a genuine basis for concern, it is
appropriate to toll the AEDPA's time bar until a reasonable period after the district court
makes a competency determination."), abrogatedby Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202
(2003).
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"next friend," essentially a temporary guardian with the authority to make
this decision on behalf of the prisoner, did not start Kelly's AEDPA clock
running "until a reasonable period" after the district court made a
competency determination.127 The Debra court's procedures also provide
for a next friend to make this decision, but only after a competency
determination has been made.128 As Amici pointed out, competency
determinations can take a long time.129 In the interest of expediting the
process, if competency is at issue such that the prisoner is unable to decide
whether or not to pursue an appeal, the court should start the clock and
mandate the appointment of a next friend to make the decision for the
prisoner instead of tolling the statute of limitations while the court makes an
official competency determination. A next friend should be appointed to
make the decision before the competency determination, not after.
Once the decision to pursue an appeal has been made, the next task an
incompetent prisoner may struggle with is assisting counsel with the claims.
Under Rohan, a stay of the proceedings was issued if the incompetent
prisoner's input is necessary to a proper adjudication of any claim. Instead
of issuing a blanket stay of the proceedings, courts should stay the
proceedings for claims that require the prisoner's input and proceed with the
adjudication of any claims that do not require the prisoner's input. Courts
also should employ a heightened standard for deciding which claims require
the prisoner's input. The Rohan court required only a showing of the
general areas where the prisoner could potentially assist counsel, explaining
that "[r]equiring counsel to identify with particularity what petitioner would
tell them were he competent .

.

. sets an unrealistically high bar under the

circumstances."' 3 0 Such a lenient standard does a poor job of preventing
frivolous claims. More than a mere threshold showing should be required to
support a finding that a prisoner's input is necessary to the claims. Counsel
should be required to argue that a prisoner's assistance is critical to the
claims. For example, a Florida court employed a higher standard by
requiring a showing of "specific factual matters at issue that require the

127.

Id.

128.

State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 736 (Wis. 1994).

129.

Amicus Brief of Utah et al. at 5-6, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir.

2010) (No. 10-930).
130. Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 817, abrogatedby Ryan v. Gonzales,
133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
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defendant to competently consult with counsel." 3' Additionally, the Nash
court's grant of a stay was based heavily on the showing of a specific factual
matter, namely, that Nash had been assisted by several attorneys over a long
period of post-conviction litigation.' 32 This special circumstance required
Nash's insight into his conversations with each attorney.133 A higher
standard ensures the prisoner's input is absolutely necessary to a proper
adjudication of the claims and thereby prevents the assertion of frivolous
claims.
B. Fairnesson Appeal

It is important to note that implementation of the above proposals is not
essential to the existence of the right to assist counsel on appeal. Arguments
about delays threaten to overshadow what should be obvious: the right to
assist counsel preserves the integrity of the criminal justice system and
outweighs any concern for judicial efficiency. The right to assist counsel
also facilitates the identification and treatment of mental illness. While
states have a legitimate interest in the finality of their judgments, the gravity
of criminal punishment, especially in capital cases, demands procedures that
uphold the primary purpose of appellate review, which is to ensure the
accuracy and reliability of the system. In 2005, the Task Force of the ABA
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities (ABA-IRR Task Force)
clarified its position on executing the mentally ill, and in the course of doing
so, specifically called on courts to suspend the post-conviction proceedings
of prisoners unable to assist counsel.134 It made no mention of delays.
These efforts should not be curtailed in an attempt to speed up an appeals

131.

Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1998).

132. Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Ryan v.
Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
133. Id.; see also Brief in Opposition at 9, Ryan v. Gonzales 623 F.3d 1242 ( 9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-930) ("Respondent, like Nash, had been represented by many attorneys
over time, including 11 at trial and sentencing, he represented himself for a portion of
that time, and he was needed to explain events so counsel would understand their
'significance and context."').
134. See Individual Rights And Responsibilities Criminal Justice Section Commission
On Mental And Physical Disability Law, ABA Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project ABA Death Penalty Representation Project Beverly Hills Bar
Association, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/122AReport.
pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
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process that is delayed for other reasons. To deprive a prisoner of this final
opportunity to assist in his or her defense on the grounds of judicial
efficiency is to ignore basic notions of fairness.
V. CONCLUSION

Once the decision to pursue an appeal has been made, a prisoner's
competency rights are nonexistent until the government decides to proceed
with an execution. In most cases, several years go by without any input
from the prisoner whatsoever.' 35 The prisoner has no right to competently
assert exculpatory facts that may reduce a sentence or even prove innocence
during this period despite the fact that collateral attacks on post-conviction
review require fact-based claims. The inability to defend oneself after
conviction is entrenched in the ABA Mental Health Criminal Justice
Standards, which instructs courts to proceed with the appeal while the
prisoner is incompetent on the rationale that most claims on appeal are based
on the record.136
Fortunately, courts today are recognizing that a right to assist counsel on
appeal protects the integrity of the criminal justice system.' 37 Nash v. Ryan
was the latest and clearest rebuttal of the old assumption that prisoners have
no role to play on appeal.138 A stay under Nash required only that a
petitioner identify claims that could potentially benefit from communication
with counsel, even if the proceeding is entirely based on the record.13 9
The last barrier to a broader recognition of this trend is the notion that a
right to assist counsel on appeal causes delays. This argument was
expressed in Ryan v. Gonzales, but the assertions found in both the
petitioner's brief and Amici's brief were fundamentally flawed.14 0 The

135.

Morgan,supra note 1.

136.

See ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, supra note 11.

137. Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by
Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
138. Nash v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated by Ryan v. Gonzales,
133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
139.

Id. at 1055.

140. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 10-930); Amicus Brief of Utah et al., Ryan v. Gonzales, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-930).
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petitioner's insistence that a right to assist counsel contravenes AEDPA is
not based on any particular provision of the statute, but rather its general
purpose to streamline federal habeas review. Amici cite cases to support
their delay argument; however, the conclusions drawn from these arguments
exaggerate the potential for systematic delays in the system. Amici also fail
to realize their own policy of ignoring competency issues at the state level
results in the very delays they seek to eliminate. The Debra and Rohan
courts ordered competency determinations and stayed the proceedings for
incompetent prisoners on the premise that a right to assist counsel on appeal
actually reduces delays.14 1 It is difficult to imagine why Amici argue against
a right that brings integrity to the appeals process and solves their delay
problem. In deciding the case, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that AEDPA
does not deprive district courts of their equitable power to issue stays for
incompetent prisoners, so long as they do not issue indefinite stays. There
has never been a better time for federal and state courts to accommodate
incompetent prisoners within the confines of AEDPA and without regard for
delays.
Courts are poised to acknowledge a right to assist counsel on appeal while
minimizing the impact of potentially spurious claims by mandating the
appointment of a next friend to initiate the appeal and proceeding with the
adjudication of any claims that do not require the prisoner's input. While
these procedures can reduce the potential for delays, the right to assist
counsel on appeal is necessary to combat the mental health crisis on appeal
regardless of delays. To ignore competency rights for the purpose of
reducing delays is both misguided and unjust.

141. State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 735 (Wis. 1994) (arguing that "[a]ssessing
competency during postconviction relief proceedings . .. eliminat[es] the difficulty of
attempting to measure that capacity months or years after the period in question.");
Rohan ex rel. v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Ryan v.
Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).

